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Abstract
This paper reviews the methods for measuring the economic cost of conﬂict. Estimat-
ing the economic costs of conﬂict requires a counterfactual calculation, which makes this
a very difﬁcult task. Social researchers have resorted to different estimation methods de-
pending on the particular effect in question. The method used in each case depends on
the units being analyzed (ﬁrms, sectors, regions or countries), the outcome variable under
study (aggregate output, market valuation of ﬁrms, market shares, etc.) and data availabil-
ity (a single cross-section, time series or panel data). This paper reviews existing methods
used in the literature to assess the economic impact of conﬂict: cost accounting, cross-
section methods, time series methods, panel data methods, gravity models, event studies,
natural experiments and comparative case studies. The paper ends with a discussion of
cost estimates and directions for further research.
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21 Introduction
Conﬂict manifests itself in several forms, from strikes, demonstrations and riots to guerrilla
warfare, terrorism and civil war. In turn, these forms of conﬂict have economic, social, psycho-
logical and other types of costs. Notwithstanding the importance of the other types of costs,
this paper focuses on measuring the economic costs of conﬂict at the aggregate level.
Estimating the economic cost of conﬂict is a difﬁcult task. It amounts to calculating what
a given economic magnitude, say GDP, would have been in the absence of conﬂict - a coun-
terfactual calculation that is difﬁcult to carry out. Conﬂict itself is an unobservable magnitude,
which makes statistical inference problematic as researchers have to resort to proxy indicators
of the level of conﬂict such as the number of casualties in a war or the number of political
assassinations. Therefore, it is not surprising that, despite its relevance, the issue has received
little attention relative to other topics. Recent events, such as September 11-th and the war in
Iraq, have triggered a new surge in this area of research. While estimating the magnitude of the
economic costs of conﬂict remains an unsettled question, the empirical evidence surveyed in
this article suggests that the costs are signiﬁcant and sizable.
In studying the economic cost of conﬂict, we will distinguish among various types of costs.
Economic costs can be classiﬁed into direct and indirect costs. For example, a civil war has
a direct economic cost equal to all property destroyed plus an indirect cost that includes the
production loss during and after the conﬂict due to casualties and capital destruction during
the conﬂict. Analyzing the temporal dimension, we can classify the economic costs of conﬂict
into contemporaneous and accumulated costs. The contemporaneous costs, also referred to as
impact costs, are those incurred in the same period as the conﬂict. The accumulated or long-run
cost is the sum of the contemporaneous costs and the discounted value of future costs.
The methods used are diverse and range from time series methods to cross-section and
panel data methods. The methods used in the literature are determined by the objective of the
study and data availability. When the objective is to assess the economic cost of conﬂict in
a particular country, region or sector, time series methods are typically used, while when the
purpose is to asses the economic impact of conﬂict for a set of countries, researchers use panel
data methods.
In this survey, we review the different methods used in the literature to estimate the eco-
nomic effect of conﬂict. There are other interesting discussions on the economic costs of vi-
olence, e.g. Skaperdas (forthcoming), while ours focuses on methods. Section 2 reviews the
method of cost accounting. Section 3 comments on regression methods using cross-section
data. Section 4 examines the contribution of time series methods, in particular interrupted time
series, transfer function and vector autorregresion methods. Regression methods using panel
dataarereviewed insection5. Section 6 coverseventstudiesfrom ﬁnancial economics. Section
7 reviews natural experiments. Section 8 reviews the comparative case study method. Finally,
section 9 ends with a discussion and offers a view of the road ahead.
32 The cost accounting method
The cost accounting method is probably the simplest and more straightforward method of es-
timating the economic cost of conﬂict. It simply adds up the monetary value of direct and
indirect costs. Direct costs estimates are based on actual data from public accounts and statisti-
cal records. The estimates of the indirect costs of conﬂict include costs such as the production
loss due to capital destruction and the compounded value of subsequent production loss dur-
ing the post-conﬂict period. Production loss estimates are subject to criticism as they require
some counterfactual estimate, typically from a regression model, plus some hypothesis about
the interest rate to be applied to calculate the compounded value.
A good example of this approach is the Arunatilake, Jayasuriya and Kelegama (2001) esti-
mates of the cost of civil war in Sri Lanka overthe 1984-1996 period. They estimateboth direct
and indirect costs. The direct cost estimates of a given magnitude are obtained by comparing
actual ﬁgures with an educated guess of what the magnitude would have been in the absence
of conﬂict. According to their estimates, the direct cost of war in Sri Lanka was 61.9 percent
of Sri Lanka’s 1996 GDP or over six billion US dollars at the then prevailing exchange rate.
This estimate includes the extra government military spending due to the war (41.3 percent of
Sri Lanka’s 1996 GDP), the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) military spending (4.1
percent), the cost of providing for the refugees (3 percent) and damages to capital assets and
land (13.5 percent). Using counterfactuals obtained from estimated regressions and plausible
scenarios, they also provide indirect costs estimates of the conﬂict due to foregone investment
(8.61 percent), reduced touristarrivals(17 percent), foregoneforeign investment(71.2percent),
human capital of dead or injured persons (2.5 percent) and other costs. Total direct and indirect
costs added up to 168 percent of Sri Lanka’s 1996 GDP.
The cost accounting method has also been applied to the evaluation of the economic cost
of participating in a war. Davis, Murphy and Topel (2006) estimated the pre-invasion present
value cost of the war in Iraq for the United States. These costs included military resources, the
value of lost lives and injuries sustained by U.S. soldiers, the lifetime medical costs of treating
injured soldiers and humanitarian assistance and post-war reconstruction. They estimated the
annual cost of war under different scenarios and then computed the present value using various
discount schemes. Their estimated cost of the war in Iraq for the U.S. ranged from 100 to 870
billions of 2003 U.S. dollars (0.9 to 7.8 percent of the U.S. GDP). In another paper, Bilmes and
Stiglitz (2006) using a similar methodology estimated that the total economic costs of the war
in Iraq for the U.S. would range from one trillion using a conservative scenario to three trillion
U.S. dollars using a moderate scenario.
The cost accounting methodology provides costs estimates that are numerically easy to
perform and the calculations can be carried out for a multiplicity of scenarios. On the negative
side, the cost accounting methodology requires expertise in listing all types of costs; otherwise
the list might not be exhaustiveand some costs could be left out or double counted. In addition,
4the design of different scenarios is problematic as they are not accompanied by their likelihood.
From a statistical point of view, the cost accounting method does not allow the researcher to
perform statistical inference as the estimates do not come with standard errors.
3 Inference based on cross-section data
A simple way to asses the economic effect of conﬂict is by means of a simpleregression model.
A regression equation is often postulated where some economic variable, the outcome, is re-
gressed on a measure of conﬂict and other control variables. When a cross-section data set on
these variables is available, one can exploit the cross-section variation in the conﬂict measure-
ment to asses its effect on the outcome variable. The quantitative value of these estimates can
be interpreted as a calculation of the effect of conﬂict on the average unit of analysis. Some
examples of this approach follow.
Venieris and Gupta (1986) provide a neat example of this methodology. They claim that
socio-political instability, an index composed by the number of deaths, protest demonstrations
and regime type, negatively affects savings. Using a sample of 49 non communist countries,






where the left hand side variable is the savings to GDP ratio and SPI stands for Socio-Political
Instability. This evidence supports the hypothesis that higher socio-political instability results
inlowersavings. Thefact thatthesocio-politicalinstabilityvariableisan indexposesaproblem
when evaluating its quantitative effect on the savings ratio as we do not know how to interpret
a change in the SPI index. An interpretation of the effect of the SPI index is possible using the
standard deviation of the index. Unfortunately, the authors do not report descriptive statistics
on theSPI indexand therefore wecannot statepreciselythequantitativeeffect of socio-political
instability on the savings to GDP ratio.
A quantitative estimate of the effect of socio-political instability on investment is feasible,
however, in a second example of this approach by Alesina and Perotti (1996). They argue
that the level of socio-political instability, an index reﬂecting political assassinations, coups
and other variables, should affect investment negatively. Using a sample of 71 countries and






where the left hand side variable is the investment to GDP ratio and SPI stands for socio-
politicalinstability. Alesinaand Perotti notethat there existsthepossibilityof reversecausation
1Hereinafter ﬁgures within parentheses are t statistics.
5from investment to socio-political instability. To avoid the reverse causation bias, Alesina and
Perotti used instrumental variable estimators. The regression coefﬁcient estimates are mean-
ingless unless the scale of the explanatory variable is speciﬁed. This poses a problem when the
explanatory variable is an index, as in the present case. One way of conducting a simple quan-
titative assessment of the impact of the SPI index on the investment ratio is as follows. Alesina
and Perotti report a standard deviation of the SPI index of 11.95. To give an idea of what this
magnitude means, 11.95 would be the increase in the index of socio-political instability when
we compare the level of socio-political instability in the USA to that of Chile. A one standard
deviation increase in the index of socio-political instability would generate a fall in investment
of 0.5×11.95 = 5.975 percentage points in the investment to GDP ratio.2 This quantitative
value requires two remarks. First, a one standard deviation change in the SPI index is a change
in this index from a low value of SPI to a high value of SPI that could be difﬁcult to observe
in any particular country in a short period of time. Second, this cross-section estimate of the
cost of conﬂict represents an average of the effect over countries. Therefore, particular conﬂict
episodes can have smaller or larger impacts on the investment ratio.
In his highly cited paper, Barro (1991) studied the sources of economic growth empirically

























is the average over the same period of the private investment to GDP ratio, y0i is the initial per
capita GDP, REV measures the number of revolutions and coups per year and ASSASS records
the number of political assassinations per million population per year. To avoid the problem
of reverse causation from growth to political instability Barro uses the instrumental variables
estimation technique. According to his ﬁndings, REV and ASSASS are measures of political
instability negatively associated with growth. Using the standard deviations of these variables
we can again compute the quantitative effect. A one standard deviation increase in the number
of revolutions and coups per year reduces per capita growth rate by almost half a percentage
point (−0.0195×0.23 = −0.0045) and private investment to GDP ratio by 1.26 percentage
points (−0.055×0.23= −0.0126). Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in the number
ofpoliticalassassinationsper millionpopulationperyearreduces percapitagrowthrate by0.29
percentage points (−0.0333×0.086 = −0.0029) and the investment ratio by 0.58 percentage
points (−0.068×0.086 = −0.0058).
2Multiplying the coefﬁcient estimate by the standard deviation of the explanatory variable is equivalent to
computing regression coefﬁcients on standardized explanatory variables, a technique often used to compare the
effects of different explanatory variables.
6Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) analyze the effect of terrorism on the net foreign direct






where the left hand side variable is the net foreign direct investment position (domestic assets
owned by foreign investors minus foreign assets held by domestic investors) over GDP and
GTI is a Global Terrorism Index. The standard deviation of the terrorism index is 19.82. A one
standard deviationchange in this index would be the change in terrorist risk if we compare Italy
with the United States (Italy having a lower terrorist risk). According to their ﬁndings, a one
standard deviation increase in terrorist risk induces a fall in the net foreign direct investment
position over GDP ratio of 0.0025×19.82= 0.0495, almost 5 percentage points.
Interestingly, Koubi (2005) studied the effect of war on growth both during the war and








where Dy60−89 and Dy75−89 stand for the average annual rate of real per capita growth during
the period 1960-1989 and 1975-1989 respectively and BD60−74 and BD60−89 are the number
of battle deaths in the 1960-1974 and 1960-1989 periods.3 Her ﬁndings indicate that contem-
poraneous effect of war on growth is negative, but the effect of war on the subsequent growth
rate during the post-war period is positive, the so called “peace dividend” effect. Koubi reports
a standard deviation of the battle deaths variable of 230,635.3, which can be used to compute
a quantitative value of the cost of conﬂict. A one standard deviation increase in the number of
battle deaths during the thirty year period would result in an average growth rate fall of 0.61
percentage points (−0.266×10−7×230,635.3 = 0.0061), more than half a percentage point
lower growth rate over a thirty year period.
Inference based on cross-section data suffers from some drawbacks. First, it is typically the
case that several covariates can be jointly determined with the dependent variable or causality
might run backwards (reverse causation) and, therefore, parameter estimates might suffer from
the endogeneity bias. In order to circumvent this problem instrumental variables estimators can
beused. Thisistheapproach followedby Alesinaand Perotti(1996)and Barro (1991). Second,
the estimated economic effects of conﬂict using cross-section datasets are to be interpreted as
averages over units of analysis. Therefore, particular conﬂict episodes can have smaller or
larger impacts. Third, cross-section inference forces researchers to adopt a static speciﬁcation
3The actual values reported by Koubi (2005) are those reported above times 10−7.
7and cannot study the dynamic effect of conﬂict on the outcome.
4 Inference using time series
Time series methods have been used in the past to assess the economic impact of conﬂict,
particularly terrorism. The identiﬁcation strategy exploits the time variation of the conﬂict
measurement for a single unit (region or country). These methods have been applied to aggre-
gate ﬁgures such as per capita gross domestic product and bilateral international trade ﬂows as
well as to sectoral ﬁgures such as tourism revenue. Three approaches have been used in the
past: the interrupted time series approach, the transfer function and vector autorregresions.
4.1 The interrupted time series approach
The Interrupted Time Series (ITS) approach, sometimes called quasi-experimental time series
analysis, is a research technique designed for analyzing different types of interventions or poli-
cies. Thismethodologyrequires availabilityoftimeseries dataon theoutcomeforeach subject.
Although the analysis is more robust when several subjects are analyzed, the method can be
applied to a single subject.
In the analysis of the economic effect of conﬂict, the intervention analyzed is a particular
conﬂict episode. A simple ITS model postulates that the outcome variable, yt, can be repre-
sented as
yt = b0+b1×Intervention Levelt +b2×Trendt +b3×InterventionTrendt +et, (1)
where Intervention Levelt is a dummy variable equal to 1 during the intervention (conﬂict)
period and zero otherwise, Trendt is a count variable equal to 1 in the ﬁrst period of the sample,
2 in the second and so on, InterventionTrendt is a count variable equal zero from the beginning
of the sample to the start of the intervention, equal to 1 in the ﬁrst period of the intervention
period, 2 in the second and so on and et is a zero mean uncorrelated disturbance. A signiﬁcant
value of b1 indicates a level change after the intervention, whereas a signiﬁcant value of b3
indicates a trend change after the intervention.
Anderson and Carter (2001) applied the ITS approach to analyze the effect of war on in-
ternational trade. Their speciﬁcation was slightly different from (1), considering two interven-
tions: war and peace. They report ITS estimates for fourteen war episodes. For instance, using
annual data for France-Germany bilateral trade (real exports plus imports) for the 1904-1928
period and considering the 1914-1918 war and subsequent peace, Anderson and Carter report
the following estimates









×War Trendt + 6.80
(9.19)
×Peace Levelt + 1.37
(5.71)
×Peace Trendt +et. (2)
According to these results, the 1914-1918 France-Germany war resulted in a signiﬁcant fall in
the international trade trend and a signiﬁcant increase in the level and trend during the post-
conﬂict peace period. Interestingly, the war and peace trends have almost the same impact with
different signs.
Equation (1) is probably the simplest ITS model, postulating a very simple time series rep-
resentation of the outcome variable as a trend plus noise model enhanced with level and trend
intervention variables. More sophisticated ITS models could accommodate other covariates,
seasonal components and serial correlation of the disturbance term, thus allowing for a more
ﬂexible time series representation of the outcome variable.
ITS methods allow the researcher to make inference on the time evolution of the outcome
aftertheintervention. Inparticular, ITSallowsforchangesinthelevelandtrendintheoutcome,
something that is not the case with other methodologies. ITS requires the exact moment to be
established when the interventionstarts and ends, creating a problem when considering conﬂict
as an intervention, as it is difﬁcult to determine exactly when a particular conﬂict starts or ends.
In addition, the artiﬁcially constructed level and trend intervention variables assume that the
intensity of the conﬂict is constant over the conﬂict period, an assumption that might not tally
with many conﬂict episodes.
4.2 The transfer function approach
In contrast with ITS, the transfer function approach resorts to measurements of conﬂict, such as
number of casualties, political assassinations, etc. It thus avoids the exact dating of the conﬂict
period and allows for different degrees of conﬂict over time. The transfer model provides a
framework for the quantitativeassessment of the contemporaneous economicimpact of conﬂict
as well as the dynamic period by period effect and the long-run accumulated effect. As an
example, consider the simplest of all possible transfer functions
yt = ayt−1+bxt +et, (3)
where the outcome variable, yt, depends on its own lag, yt−1, the contemporaneous value of the
conﬂict measurement, xt, and a zero mean shock, et. Suppose that the conﬂict measurement
experiments a unit increase in period t and returns to its original level from timet+1 onwards.
The contemporaneous response of the outcome variable equals b, at time t +1 the outcome
increases by ab, at timet+2 by a2b, at time t+3 by a3b, and so on. Under the assumption that
parameter a is smaller than unity in absolute value, the outcome variable time series is station-
ary and we can compute the accumulated response to a unit increase in conﬂict measurement as
b(1+a+a2+a3+...) = b/(1−a). Therefore, the response of the outcome variable is higher
the larger the value of b and this response is more persistent the closer the value of a to unity.
9Theoretically, the value of b should be negative, that is, an increase in the conﬂict measurement
should reduce the outcome variable.








where yt is the outcome variable such as per capita GDP, xt is a measure of conﬂict intensity,
A(L),C(L) and D(L) are polynomials of the form A(L) = 1−a1L−a2L2−....−apLp, L is the
lag operator, B(L) = b0−b1L−b2L2−....−bqLq and et is a zero-mean white noise. It is easy
to see that equation (3) can be obtained from equation (4) assuming A(L) = D(L) = 1−aL,
B(L) = b and C(L) = 1.
The transfer function methodology is a powerful tool for measurement and provides a sim-
ple interpretation of the dynamics of the cost of conﬂict. Some selective applications of this
methodology follow. In an inﬂuential paper, Enders, Sandler and Parise (1992) used transfer
function analysis to estimate the effect of transnational terrorism on tourism receipts in Greece,
Italy and Austria during the 1968-1988 period. Their outcome variable yt was the (log) share
of quarterly tourism revenues relative to that of all other countries in the sample (the market
share). Their measure of terrorism, xt, was the number of transnational terrorism incidents. For








According to their ﬁndings, a unit increase in the number of terrorism incidents, xt, reduces
Greece’s tourism market share by the amount of 0.0064 three quarters later. The reason for
this delay in the response, the authors argue, is that “it takes time for tourists to revise their
plans; many reservations on airlines and cruise ships cannot be altered without paying a sizable
premium.” Therefore, an additional terrorist incident in Greece resulted in a fall in the (log of)
Greece’s tourism market share of 0.0064 (e0.0064 = 1.0064 percentage loss of market share),
three quarters later, 0.0064×0.7085 = 0.0045 (e0.0045 = 1.0045 percentage loss of market
share) four quarters later, and so on.4
Another application of the transfer function approach is Enders and Sandler (1996) where
they analyze the effect of terrorism on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). By inducing a sense
of fear and heightened ﬁnancial risks, terrorism can dissuade foreign capital inﬂows and scare
domestic capital away. Using data on net (inﬂows minus outﬂows) foreign direct investment











4Because 0.0064 is the effect of an additional terrorism incident on the conditional mean of the log market
share and this is not equal to the log of the conditional mean, exponentiation is only an approximation.
10where yt is the change in net foreign direct investment measured in millions of (real 1990) US
dollars and xt is the number of transnational terrorist incidents. According to their estimates, an
additional transnational terrorist incident in Spain leads to a fall of 23.8 millions of US dollars
in net FDI into Spain eleven quarters later. Since the estimated coefﬁcient of the ﬁrst lag of net
FDI is negative, the net FDI response to the incident oscillates from negativeto positive, and so
on. Twelve quarters after the incident, net FDI rises by 23.8×0.593 = 14.113 millions of US
dollars.
The transfer function methodology constitutes a powerful way of conducting an individual
case analysis of the economic effect of conﬂict at the aggregate (country or sector) level and
potentially could be used to analyze the microeconomic consequences of conﬂict, although we
have not been able to ﬁnd any such application in the literature. As compared with the ITS
approach, transfer function applications typically provide a better time series representation of
the outcome variable by allowing for lags of the outcome and conﬂict measurements, as well
as a ﬂexible disturbance dynamics. Transfer function modelling, however, cannot incorporate
other potential determinants of the outcome variable into the analysis, other than the conﬂict
measurement. In addition, the transfer function approach relies on the assumption of strict
exogeneity of the conﬂict measurement, yielding inconsistent estimates when there is reverse
causation from the outcome to the conﬂict variable.
4.3 Vector autorregresions
Another way to model the dynamic interaction between the outcome variable and conﬂict mea-
surement is the vector autorregresion (VAR) approach. Within this context, both the outcome
variable and the conﬂict measurement as well as possibly other variables are jointly determined
by lagged values of all variables considered. The simplest of all VAR models is a two-variable
one-lag model for the outcome, yt, and the conﬂict measurement, xt, of the form
yt = a11yt−1+a12xt−1+eyt (5)
xt = a21yt−1+a22xt−1+ext
where the aij’s are parameters and eyt and ext are zero mean random disturbances which can
be contemporaneously correlated. When the set of right hand side variables is the same for all
equations and there are no restrictions on the parameters of the VAR, estimation boils down
to a simple ordinary least squares regression for each equation. The VAR captures the causal
effect of conﬂict on the outcome through the ﬁrst equation and also allows for feedback from
the economic outcome to the conﬂict measurement through the second equation.
The VAR technique allows us to estimate the response of the outcome to a shock in the
conﬂict measurement. Forillustration,supposey0 =x0 =0; weshock theconﬂict measurement
in one unit, ex1 = 1 and keep all the other shocks equal to zero, ex2 = ... = ext = ey1 = ... =
11eyt = 0. As a result of this shock, the time path of the outcome would be y1 = 0, y2 = a12,
y3 =(a11+a12)a22, ... and the timepath of theconﬂict measurement would be x1 =1, x2 =a22,
x3 = a21a12+a2
22, ... These sequences are the Impulse Response Functions (IRF) and can be
computedas afunction ofthecoefﬁcients of theVAR. Addingup theseresponses wouldgiveus
the accumulated response. Note that, for the shock to have any effect on the outcome, a12 must
be non-zero. Otherwise, the time pattern of the outcome would be unchanged by the shock. In
the latter case, when a12 = 0, it is said that xt does not Granger-cause yt.5
Enders and Sandler (1991) postulated a VAR for the number of tourists visiting Spain, nt,
and the number of transnational terrorist incidents in Spain, it. Their speciﬁcation was slightly
different from the simplest model (5)
nt = a1+A11(L)nt−1+A12(L)it−1+ent
it = a2+A21(L)nt−1+A22(L)it−1+eit
where the alphas include a constant term and seasonal dummies and the Aij(L) are polynomials
in the lag operator. Using monthly data for the period 1970-1988, they ﬁtted a 12-lag VAR
and found that the number of terrorist incidents Granger-caused the number of tourists (that is,
they rejected the hypothesis A12(L) = 0), but the number of tourists did not Granger-cause the
number of terrorist incidents. The VAR model allowed them to compute the impulse response
functionto a shock in eit. As a result ofa unitshock in thedisturbanceoftheincidents equation,
theaccumulated responseof thenumberoftouristswas that140,847touristsdidnot visitSpain.
In addition to Granger-causality tests and IRF analysis, VARs can be used to generate short
term forecasts under different scenarios of the future path of conﬂict measurements. An appli-
cationofthisshorttermpredictioncapabilityisEcksteinand Tsiddon(2004). Theypostulateda
VAR for the Israeli economy during the 1980-2003 period including (the logs of) four macroe-
conomic magnitudes, per capita GDP, investment, exports and non-durable consumption. They
used a terrorism index as a predetermined right hand side variable in all four equations of the
VAR. According to their ﬁndings, terrorism had a negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient in all but
the consumption equation.6 Using the estimated VAR up to the third quarter of 2003, Eckstein
and Tsiddon simulated the paths of all four variables for the period 2003:4 to 2005:3 under
three scenarios: (i) terror stops as of 2003:4, (ii) terror continues until 2004:3 and (iii) terror
continues until 2005:3. Under those scenarios, per capita GDP growth would have been 2.5
percent, 0 percent and -2 percent respectively.
Probably as VAR models are easy to estimate, the VAR methodology is very popular and
provides an easy way to compute of IRFs, Granger causality tests and short term forecasts.
However, VAR methods are bound to be applied to single subject analysis. With higher com-
5See Granger (1969).
6Note that since all equations include lags of all variables, it is sufﬁcient that the terrorism index is signiﬁcant
in only one equation for it to have effects on all four variables.
12puting capabilities and information availability, often researchers have time series information
on a set of subjects, that is, a panel data set. We next turn into the analysis of this data type and
methods used therein.
5 Panel data methods
Oftentimes, the cost of conﬂict assessment is attempted using time series data on several coun-
tries, i.e. a panel data set. The identiﬁcation strategy exploits the time and cross-section vari-
ation in the level of conﬂict. This type of data allows the researcher to control for unobserved
heterogeneity, something that cannot be accounted for with either time series or cross sections.
The available evidence on the economic effects of conﬂict using panel data focuses on
growth determinants and includes conﬂict measures as explanatory variables. As their goal is
to study the long-run determinants of growth, they use long time spans, decades or ﬁve years
intervals, as their time unit interval. Their basic speciﬁcation is
Dyit = at +gi+Xitb +eit (6)
where Dyit is the per capita growth rate of country i over period t, at is a period speciﬁc
unobserved effect, gi is a country speciﬁc unobserved effect, Xit is a 1×K vector of explanatory
variables, b is a conformable vector of parameters and eit is a zero mean disturbance.
Researchers have used different procedures to account for unobserved heterogeneity: the
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) procedure, the ﬁxed-effect dummy-variable approach
and the Chamberlain (1982) approach. These three methodologies are analyzed next. In addi-
tion, a further method of analysis involves three dimensional data structures arising in the study
of the effects of conﬂict on bilateral international trade ﬂows.
5.1 The SUR procedure
The SUR procedure considers the data for each time period (decade) as a cross-section regres-
sion and estimates as many equations as time periods (decades). Stacking the observations for,
say T, different decades DYi = (Dyi1,....,DyiT)′, Xi = (X′
i1,....,X′
iT)′,Ui = (ei1+gi,....,eiT +gi)′
and the unobserved time effects a = (a1,...,aT)′ we form a T-dimensional system
DYi = a +Xib +Ui
that can be estimated by the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) procedure. Notice that
the effect of the covariates on growth, b, is constrained to be equal across equations (decades).
This procedure allows for unobserved random country speciﬁc effects, and ﬁxed time effects
captured by different period speciﬁc intercepts. Two examples of this approach follow.
13In their study on growth determinants, Barro and Lee (1994) use a sample of 95 countries
overtwo decades, 1965-1975and 1975-1985. Thus, they analyze a two periods (decades) panel
dataset. Oneoftheircovariates, thenumberofrevolutionsisameasureofconﬂict similarto the
political instability covariates entered in the cross-section regressions discussed above. Using




where Dyit is the growth rate of per capita GDP of country i over decade t. Therefore, an
additional revolution during a decade reduces the average growth rate during a decade in 1.71
per cent points.
Easterly and Levine (1997) use an unbalanced panel of 95 countries over the three decades
period 1960-1989 to shed light on the effect of ethnic diversity on growth. Although it was
not their goal to measure the effect of conﬂict on economic growth, their regressions included
the average number of political assassinations per capita during a decade as a proxy for the





Their ﬁndings indicate one additional (average per capita) political assassination during a
decade results in a fall of the average growth rate over a decade by 2.4 percentage points.
5.2 The ﬁxed-effects dummy-variable approach
The ﬁxed-effect dummy-variable approach assumes that the time and country unobserved ef-
fects, at and gi, are ﬁxed and uses period and country speciﬁc dummy variables. This is by far
the most popular method used in the literature. Some applications of this methodology for the
estimation of the effects of war and terrorism on growth follow.
Collier (1999) presents evidence on the effect of civil wars on the rate of growth using
a sample of 78 countries over the three decades 1960-1989 (three time units, one for each
decade). He found a negative and signiﬁcant effect of civil war on economic growth. He




where Dyit is country i’s average annual per capita GDP growth rate in decade t and Wit is the
number of months with civil war in country i during decade t. The coefﬁcient on Wit gives us
7In fact, Easterly and Levine use the average number of political assassinations per thousand population over
a decade and get an estimate equal to -23.78.
14the marginal effect of an additional month of civil war on the decade-average annual growth
rate. Therefore, an entire decade of war (120 months) reduces the average growth in 2.4 per
cent points (0.0002×120 = 0.024).
Caplan (2002) analyzed the different effects of wars fought at foreign and domestic soil
on growth, inﬂation, public expending, tax revenue and monetary growth. Using a sample of







where FWit and DWit are dummy variables deﬁned as equal to one if country i in year t fought
a war in foreign and domestic soil respectively and zero otherwise. The coefﬁcient on the
foreign war dummy is positive and only signiﬁcant at the ten per cent level. The coefﬁcient
on the domestic war dummy is negative and marginally signiﬁcant. Since growth rates are
measured in percentage points, an additional year of domestic war reduces the growth rate
by 2.03 percentage points. In contrast with Collier (1999), Caplan does not control for any
covariates but his estimate of the effect of domestic war is very similar to Collier’s estimate of
the effect of civil war.
Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides (2004) provide evidence on the effect of various forms of
conﬂict on economic growth. They consider terrorism, internal conﬂict and external conﬂict.











where Dyit is the rate of growth of per capita GDP for country i in period t, and Tit, Iit and
Eit are dummy variables indicating whether in country i in period t there was, respectively,
a terrorist incident, internal conﬂict and external conﬂict. Terrorism seems to have a lower
economic impact than internal conﬂict which in turn has a lower effect than external conﬂict
and this is in fact what the authors claim. However, multiplying coefﬁcients estimates by the
standard deviation of the covariates yields 0.438×0.443 = 0.194, 1.270×0.355 = 0.451 and
3.745×0.094 = 0.352 respectively, showing that the effect of external conﬂict is in fact lower
than the effect of internal conﬂict. Contrary to Caplan (2002) ﬁndings, the effect of external
conﬂict turns out to be negative.8
Tavares (2004) also provides evidence on the effect of terrorism on per capita GDP growth.
He uses a sample of unspeciﬁed countries for the period 1987-2001 and reports the following
8Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides’ (2004) deﬁnition of external conﬂict includes wars fought on domestic soil











where Tit isthe numberofterrorist attacks per 10millioninhabitants,PRit standsfor thelevelof
political rights, an index ranging from 0 to 1. According to his results, a one standard deviation
increase in the level of terrorism leads to a fall in per capita GDP growth of about 0.17 per
cent (0.029×5.99 = 0.17) in a country scoring at lower end of political rights index and to
an increase in per capita GDP growth of 0.55 per cent ((−0.029+0.121)×5.99 = 0.55) for a
country scoring at the upper end of the political rights index.
Neumayer (2004) estimates the effect of political violence on tourist arrivals using a panel






where nit is the (log of) the number of annual tourist arrivals (overnight visitors) and cit is
UppsalaConﬂict Data Project armed conﬂict intensityindex. A one standard deviationincrease
intheconﬂictindexresultsina(0.12×0.82=0.0984)9.8 percentfall inthenumberoftourists
the same year, (0.0984×0.63= 0.062) a 6.2 per cent fall a year after, and so on.
5.3 The Chamberlain approach
The third approach to estimate the economic cost of conﬂict using panel data follows a pro-
cedure designed by Chamberlain (1982). Instead of assuming that the unobserved effects are
ﬁxedorrandom, Chamberlainsuggestedthatunobservedeffectscouldbelinearfunctionsofthe
covariates, that is, gi = y +å
T
t=1Xitlt +vit. Under this assumption and ignoring time effects,
equation (6) becomes
Dyit = y +Xi1l1+...+Xit(b +lt)+...+XiTlT +rit
where rit = eit +vit. For illustration consider the T = 2 case where
Dyi1 = y +Xi1(b +l1)+Xi2l2+ri1,
Dyi2 = y +Xi1l1+Xi2(b +l2)+ri2.
Chamberlain proposes a two-step estimation procedure of the vector of structural parameters
q = (y,l′
1,l′





2)′ are estimated by OLS applied to each equation. In the second step,
the structural parameters are estimated by classical minimum distance, that is, minimizing
16the quadratic form (ˆ p −Hq)′X( ˆ p −Hq), where X is a positive deﬁnite matrix and H is a
conformable auxiliary matrix with zeros and ones.
Knight, Loayza and Villanueva (1996) applied Chamberlain approach to quantify the effect
of wars on ouput per capita growth rates and the investment to GDP ratio using a panel of 79



















where Wit is the number of war years in a particular ﬁve-year interval as a fraction of the total
number of years in the sample. They ﬁnd a negative effect of war on per capita GDP growth
and investment to output ratio, although the former is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Knight, Loayza and Villanueva (1996) acknowledge the existence of a two-channel mecha-
nism through which war affects growth. A direct effect of war captured by the growth equation
and an indirect effect through investment. According to their estimates, if the fraction of war
years in the sample increases 1.5 additional war years (a ten percent of the number of years in
the sample), the total incidence of war cost of conﬂict would be a reduction of the per capita
growth rate in 3.5 percentage points ((−0.0132−0.0165×1.3232)×0.1= −0.035).
5.4 Gravity equations
Gravity equations are very popularin internationaltrade studies. They are specially designed to
ﬁt a special type of three dimensional data arrays. For illustration consider a set of J countries
and let xijt be country i’s (log) exports to country j in period t. Thus, for a given time period
there are (J×(J−1)) trade ﬂows. A gravity model assumes trade ﬂows are proportional to the
countries’ income, their distance, and other control variables as given by
ln(xijt) = b1ln(1+zitzjt)+b2ln(yityjt)+b3ln(yityjt/pitpjt)+b4ln(dij)+other covariates
where zitzjt is the product of the countries measurements of conﬂict at time t, yityjt is the
product of countriesi and j real GDPs in periodt, pitpjt is theproduct of countries’populations
and dij is the distance between countries.
Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) report evidence for more than 200 countries during the
1968-1979 period on the effect of various forms of conﬂict on trade. They report an estimate
of b1 equal to −0.041 (t-stat −5.87) when zit is the number of terrorist incidents in country i at
periodt.Sincebothtradeﬂows and conﬂictare measured inlogs, coefﬁcients can beinterpreted
as elasticities. Thus, a100 percent changein zitzjt resulted ina 4 percent fall in exports.9 Nitsch
9The impact might look like small, but it is large. A 100 percent increase in zitzjt does not require such a
17and Schumacher also used the number of political assassinations as a measure of conﬂict, their
estimate of b1 was in this case−0.160 (t-stat −16.0). Repeating the same exercise with conﬂict
measured as the fraction of the sample period involved in external war, their estimate of b1 was
−0.395 (t-stat −14.1).
Glick and Taylor (2010) used a gravity model to assess the effect of war on trade. They as-
sembled a sample of 172 countries during the 1870-1997 period from various sources and used
average exports and imports ﬂows between country pairs. Instead of a continuousmeasurement
of conﬂict, Glick and Taylor included a dummy variable Dijt equal to one when countries i and
j were engaged in war in period t and zero otherwise, as well as up to ten lags of the dummy

























There is a clear decaying pattern in coefﬁcient estimates, which are statistically signiﬁcant up
to the eight lag. As trade is measured in logs but war is not, the interpretation of coefﬁcients
is more involved. The contemporaneous contribution of the war dummy to (log) trade ﬂows
is −1.78 as compared with the contribution of no war, 0. Thus, war reduces trade to eighty
three per cent (e0 −e−1.78 = 0.83) contemporaneously, and to seventy two percent one year
later (e0−e−1.28 = 0.72), and so on.10
6 Event studies
A further methodology used in assessing the economic impact of conﬂict is the event study
methodology. Event studies are used to measure the effect on stock prices of certain types of
eventssuchasthereleaseofinformationonproﬁts, dividendpayments,corporatedebtissuance,
investment decisions, etc. This methodology relies on the assumption of efﬁcient markets ac-
cording to which share prices should reﬂect all available information, including any economic
or social event. Therefore, if conﬂict affects the economy, then conﬂict related events should
be accompanied by changes in stock prices.
The event study methodology identiﬁes abnormal returns on stock prices as the difference
between the actual return and the normal return on a stock. Let Pt be the stock price at time
t and Rt = (Pt −Pt−1)/Pt−1 its rate of return. Normal returns are computed as the mean daily
return on a window of T trading days before each event: if t = 0 is the day of the event, the
change in both countries. For instance, if countries i and j experience 5 terrorist attacks, zitzjt = 25. Then, an
increase to 7 terrorist attacks in both countries (a 40 percent increase) results in, zitzjt = 49, almost a 100 percent
increase in zitzjt.
10Because the estimated equation is the conditional mean of the log trade ﬂows, exponentiation does not yield
the conditional mean of trade ﬂows. However, it should be taken as an approximation.
18normal return is computed as the arithmetic mean of daily returns from t = −t1 to t = −t2. The
abnormal return, computed as







is considered the effect of the event on the stock return. In addition to abnormal returns, the






where I is the number of periods during which the returns are accumulated. Some applications
of this methodology follow.
Chen and Siems (2004) investigated the Dow Jones Industrial index reaction to 14 terrorist
and military events. Out of the 14 events analyzed, 12 had a statistically signiﬁcant abnormal
return and the September 11th was the event with the largest abnormal return (-7.14 per cent).
Chen and Siems also applied the same methodology to asses the effect of the 9/11 event on
33 stock market indexes from 28 countries, 31 of which exhibited negative and statistically
signiﬁcant abnormal returns.
A more sophisticated way of computing the normal return is the market model of ﬁnancial
economics
Rit = biRMt +uit
where Rit is the return on stock i on day t in excess over the risk-free rate of return, RMt is
the return on the market portfolio (also measured in excess over the risk free rate of return)
and uit is a zero mean disturbance. Identifying the normal return as the systematic part of
the previous equation implies that the residuals from this equation are the abnormal returns.
The market model is sometimes extended to a three-factor model à la Fama and French (1993,
1996). Using this framework, a few other papers provide evidence in favour of the hypothesis
that terrorism and violent conﬂict affects asset prices negatively, see Chesney and Reshetar
(2007), Guidolin and La Ferrara (2005) and Drakos (2004, 2009).
A monetary ﬁgure of the impact of terrorism on stock prices is provided by Karolyi and
Martell (2005) who ﬁnd that during the 1995-2002 period, the 75 terrorist attacks against pub-
licly traded US companies had on average a direct impact on the ﬁrm’s stock rate of return of
-0.83 per cent, which amounted to 401 million US dollars in market capitalization.
Conﬂict does not always have a negative effect on stock prices, Guidolin and La Ferrara
(2007) found that the death of the rebel leader and the sudden end of the war in Angola in 2002
resulted in an abnormal return of −0.032 in the portfolio of diamond mining ﬁrms holding
concessions in Angola. This ﬁnding indicates that the war conﬂict had a positive effect of
those stocks. Similarly, Berrebi and Klor (2010) found that terrorism has a 7 percent positive
abnormal return in a portfolioof Israeli defence stocksand a negative5 percent abnormal return
19in a portfolio of Israeli non-defence stocks.
7 Natural experiments
In an experiment, the scientist studies the effect of a treatment on a sample of subjects as
compared with a control sample of untreated subjects. In a controlled experiment, assignment
of subjects to treatment and control groups is random. In social science research, assignment of
subjects to treatment or control samples is oftentimes unethical, unlawful or unfeasible. In this
cases, scientists resort to quasi-experimental methods, sometimes referred to as observational
studies or natural experiments.11 In a natural experiment, the scientist has no control over
the assignment of subjects to treatment and control groups: sometimes subjects select their
own treatment, other times their environments impose the treatment upon them. Self-selection
into a treatment may generate an important bias in the results. A natural experiment exploits
an irrelevant event that results in haphazard assignment of subjects to treatment and control
groups. A natural experiment is more informative about a causal effect when the researcher
observes a large and clear change in the treatment that affects only a sub-population.
The quasi-experimental methodology has been applied to measure the effect of terrorist
conﬂict on various economic magnitudes. Two examples of this methodology follow. Abadie
and Gardeazabal (2003) used the September 18, 1998 - November 28, 1999 cease ﬁre declared
byterroristorganizationETAasanaturalexperimenttoassestheeffectofterrorismonthestock
market valuation of Spanish companies. In experimental terms, the cease ﬁre is the treatment.
If the terrorist conﬂict was perceived to have a negativeimpact on the Basque economy, Basque
stocks (stocks of ﬁrms with a signiﬁcant part of their business in the Basque Country) should
have shown a positive performance relative to non-Basque stocks (stocks of ﬁrms without a
signiﬁcantpart oftheirbusinessin theBasque Country)as thetruce becamecredible. Similarly,
Basque stocks should have performed poorly, relative to non-Basque stocks, at the end of the
truce. The portfolio of Basque stocks can be viewed as the treated sample and the portfolio
















where RBasque and RNon−Basque stand for the return on the Basque and non-Basque portfolios,
RMarket is the return on the market portfolio and DGood and DBad are dummy variables that take
the value of one during a “Good News” period when the cease-ﬁre became credible and a “Bad
News” period when the peace process collapsed. In accordance with the theoretical prediction,
11See Rosenbaum (2005).
20the dummy variables were signiﬁcant for the Basque portfolio and not signiﬁcant for the non-
Basque portfolio. Compounding the 0.0044 coefﬁcient on the Good News dummy over the
22 trading sessions of the Good News period yields a compounded abnormal return of 10.14
percent for the Basque portfolio relative to the non-Basque portfolio. Analogous calculations
yield a -11.21-percent compounded abnormal return for the Basque portfolio relative to the
non-Basque portfolio during the 66 trading sessions of the Bad News period.
Benmelech, Berrebi and Klor (2010) analyzed the cost in terms of employment opportuni-
ties and wages of harboring terrorism in Palestinian districts. They used a sample of all 143
suicide attacks in Israel by Palestinians between September 2000 and December 2006. Ben-
melech, Berrebi and Klor noticed that some of the suicide attack attempts were interrupted by
security forces or civilians while others reached their targets. This fact permits an experimental
interpretation of their results. The treatment in this case is the “successfulness” of the attacks.
The treated sample would be the sample of all the attacks which reached their targets and the




where i indexes the district where the attack originated, Duit is the change in district i’s un-
employment rate in the quarter when the attack took place and the following quarter and Dit
is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when the attack reached its target and zero other-
wise. Districts where “successful” attacks originated exhibited a 1.4 percentage points higher
increase in the unemployment rate.
Randomized experiments have good internal validity, that is, they are good for establish-
ing a causal relationship. Natural experiments, like the ones surveyed here, have less internal
validity than randomized experiments. Sometimes nature provides a haphazard treatment as-
signment, thus providing a fairly high internal validity. External validity, the possibility of
generalizing the results of the natural experiment to other populations, might be low particu-
larly when, as in the Basque and Palestinian examples, the analysis corresponds to a speciﬁc
conﬂict.
8 Comparative case studies
A case study is a tool in social science research. It is a meticulous study of a single unit. This
methodology has also been used to asses the economic cost of conﬂict in countries or regions
under conﬂict. When analyzing a pool of countries, the resulting estimate of the economic cost
of conﬂict can be interpreted as the average effect. The average impact of conﬂict surely over
estimates the effect for some units and under estimates the effect for others. Case studies have
the potential of identifying particularly large or small effects for speciﬁc units. In addition, a
careful study of a single unit allows the researcher to pay more attention to particular mecha-
21nismsthatmightpassunnoticedin theaggregate. Therefore, thecase studymethodologystands
up as a powerful tool of research. Having the possibility of analyzing a single unit in depth,
however, comes at the cost of losing external validity, as the results might be due to speciﬁc
characteristics of the particular unit being analyzed.
In fact, many of the previously mentioned papers are case studies. There are case studies
of the effect of armed conﬂict in Nicaragua (DiAddario, 1997), Nepal (Kumar, 2003) and Sri
Lanka (Arunatilake, Jayasuriya and Kelegama, 2001). Case studies have also been used in
order to study the economic effects of terrorism in Israel (Eckstein and Tsiddon, 2004) and
Spain (Enders and Sandler, 1991 and 1996). There are also examples of case studies of the
economic effect of conﬂicts in speciﬁc sectors such as the effect of the 9/11 terrorist events
on airline stocks (Drakos 2004) and Chicago real estate market (Abadie and Dermisi 2008 and
Dermisi 2007). The common denominator of these studies is the fact that they concentrate
on a single unit. These papers use some of the previously mentioned techniques to asses the
economic impact of conﬂict and therefore will not be reviewed here.
A particular type of case study deserves more attention: the comparative case study. Com-
parative case studies are often used by researchers to study the effect of events or policy mea-
sures on aggregate units such as regions or countries. The goal in these studies is to estimate
the evolution of outcomes for a unit affected by an event and compare it with the evolution of
a control group. It is often the case that there is not a single control unit with the same charac-
teristics of the unit exposed and therefore a combination of control units is a better comparison
group than any single unit. A particular way of carrying out this comparison is the synthetic
control method suggested by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and reﬁned by Abadie, Diamond
and Hainmueller (2010).
The synthetic control method can be easily described as follows. Let J be the number of
available control units and W = (w1,...,wJ) a vector of non negative weights which sum to
one. Let X1 be a (K ×1) vector of pre-conﬂict values of K relevant characteristics for the
treated unit and X0 be a (K ×J) matrix which contains the values of the same variables for
the J possible controls. These K covariates are those factors the researcher believes affect the
outcome variable. LetV be a diagonal matrix with non-negativecomponents. The values of the
diagonal elements ofV reﬂect the relative importance of the different covariates. The vector of
weightsW∗ is chosen to minimize (X1−X0W)′V(X1−X0W) subject to wj ≥ 0 (j = 1,2,...,J)
and w1+...+wJ = 1. The weights chosen in this manner deﬁne a synthetic control unit with
covariate values X0W∗, a linear combination of the potential control units characteristics. Once
the match between the treated unit and the synthetic control is done, it remains to compute
the counterfactual value of the outcome variable during the post-treatment period. Let Y1 be
a (T ×1) vector whose elements are measurements of the outcome variable for the treated
unit during the post-treatment period. Similarly, let Y0 be a (T ×J) matrix which contains the
values of the same variables for the control units. The counterfactual values of the outcome is
computed as Y∗
1 = Y0W∗. The difference between the actual and counterfactual values of the
22outcome isY1−Y∗
1 .
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) used this procedure to estimate the economic impact of
terrorism in the Basque Country economy. Using the synthetic control method, Abadie and
Gardeazabal formed a comparison group as a combination of other Spanish regions that was
“similar” in various economic dimensions (thought to be potential growth determinants) to
the Basque Country economy in the period prior to the uprising of terrorism. The output gap
between the actual and counterfactual values yielded a 10 percent annual per capita GDP loss
over a 20-year period, a sizable output loss.
The synthetic control method allows the researcher to conduct placebo analysis by apply-
ing the same procedure to an untreated subject. Abadie and Gardeazabal applied the same
procedure to another Spanish region, Catalonia, not directly affected by a terrorist conﬂict. The
placebo comparison for Catalonia displayed a very small output gap. Furthermore, conducting
the placebo study on all untreated subjects yields an empirical distribution of outcome gap (the
difference between the outcome of the treated and its synthetic control). This empirical distri-
bution can be used to assess the statistical signiﬁcance of the outcome gap for the treated. This
method is specially suited for a single unit analysis. However, the method is potentially useful
for application to multiple units, although there is no guarantee that a good match can be found
for all units.
9 Discussion
This paper reviews the methods for assessing the economic cost of conﬂict and illustrates them
with a selective collection of examples. Overall, the literature reviewed shows that conﬂict
exerts signiﬁcant economic costs. Since conﬂict is a latent variable for which only proxy mea-
surements are available, classical error-in-variables econometrics suggests that regression esti-
mates of the effect of conﬂict should be downward biased, assuming errors of measurement are
uncorrelated with the latent variable.
After reviewing the literature, we believe there are several issues that deserve further atten-
tion. First, the papers reviewed offer a wide range of estimates from low to high quantities.
This is particularly true for the panel data evidence reported above. There are several reasons
for this heterogeneity of results. First, not all types of conﬂict have the same economic cost.
Political instability, terrorism and war have very different economic impacts. A second source
of variation accrues from the different samples (units and periods) and methods used by re-
searchers. Therefore, the ﬁndings of several independent studies need to be integrated. Even
though a meta-analysis seems rather difﬁcult to carry out, some extra effort in this direction is
needed.
Second, the empirical evidence reviewed in this survey focuses primarily on establishing
a causal link between conﬂict and some economic magnitude and often little attention is paid
to determining the quantitative effect. As argued above, after the causal link is established,
23generally by the statistical signiﬁcance of a parameter estimate, researchers sometimes do not
take the further step of quantifying the effect. Examples of this practice are most of the cross-
section and panel data evidencereviewed. We havesometimesbeen ableto takethis further and
simple step. For instance, in some of the cross-section and panel data items reviewed above,
we have been able to quantify the costs by simple arithmetic. These require knowledge of the
scale of the conﬂict measurement which is not always reported.
Third, further research is needed in the area of policy analysis. It would be interesting to
estimate the economic cost of policies and the beneﬁts they bring about so that a cost-beneﬁt
analysis could be performed. Policy effectiveness and its quantitative assessment, however,
remains an unexplored issue.
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